Research

Publications


Accepted for publication in the Journal of Financial Economics.    


We study arbitrage in a repeated game framework with multiple arbitrage opportunities. Arbitrageurs do not step on each other's toes and specialize in the arbitrage opportunities they exploit. This is a tacit collusion equilibrium. Our empirical analysis provides evidence from the U.S. options market consistent with our theory.


A part of this paper was previously circulated under the title, "Profiting from Investor Mistakes: Evidence from Suboptimal Option Exercise.''  


Best Paper Award at the 2023 Colorado Finance Summit


   Media coverage: The Economist, Bloomberg

Equilibrium consequences of fund managers’ compensation contracts include crowded trades, excessive benchmarking and excessive asset management costs. Through their use of benchmarks, fund investors impose externalities on each other. Socially optimal contracts diverge from privately optimal ones.  

Firms included in popular benchmarks are effectively subsidized by asset managers.  This “subsidy” comes from the inelastic demand of fund managers for stocks in their benchmark and it works through the cost of capital.   A non-technical summary and media coverage: VoxEU, LBSR, Barron’s  

                                                                                                                                               

Longer version reprinted in: Essays in Dynamic General Equilibrium Theory: Festschrift for David Cass, 2005, pp. 1-34, Studies in Economic Theory, vol. 20. Heidelberg and New York: Springer.


Book Chapters


Working Papers

 

  


Work in Progress